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Experimentation and Capability Development
Thomas Keil, Erkko Autio and Gerard George
Helsinki University of Technology; Imperial College London; Imperial College London
abstract Studies invoking a capabilities lens often ascribe deliberateness in organizational
decisions to develop new capabilities. Drawing on five longitudinal case studies of large, global
firms in the information and communication technology sector, we examine how firms
engender cognizance of their future capability needs in situations characterized by high
decision-making uncertainty. We develop a theoretical account of how firms use investments in
start-ups to actively engage in experimentation outside organizational boundaries, a learning
process which we term as disembodied experimentation. Disembodied experimentation creates
awareness of voids in the capability base of an incumbent and helps to overcome inertial
restraints thereby influencing the decision to invest in capability development. The relationship
between learning from disembodied experimentation and the decision to develop capabilities is
moderated by knowledge brokering functions and adaptation complexity.
INTRODUCTION
The development and deployment of capabilities to achieve superior performance is an
issue of substantive interest to organizational scholars (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000;
Helfat and Peteraf, 2003). While resource-based arguments for performance are perva-
sive, an emerging dialogue suggests that capability building represents a key mechanism
through which firms can create value from their resource pools and adapt to evolving
competitive landscapes (Levinthal, 2000; Teece et al., 1997), particularly in highly
dynamic environments. In dynamic sectors, such as Information and Communication
Technology (ICT), incumbents are frequently challenged to respond to disruptive
change (Eisenhardt, 1989b). Not only are radical technological changes often associated
with business model change, disruptions are often accompanied by new business prac-
tices (Chesbrough, 2002). This makes it challenging for industry incumbents to respond
by integrating new technologies and practices to existing operations. The socially embed-
ded nature of emergent practice may also lock incumbents out of the social networks that
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drive the disruption. Further, the dynamic nature of emergent practice makes it difficult
for incumbents to understand, evaluate and internalize them by relying on observation
or mimetic behaviours alone.
Even though studies have greatly added to our understanding of how firms build their
functional capabilities or their capacity to integrate capabilities across organizational
units (e.g. Helfat, 1997; Zahra and Nielsen, 2002), relatively little is known about how
firms become aware of their capability needs when faced with external disruption. This is
an important gap: research on managerial cognition has shown that awareness and
understanding of capability needs are central for soliciting an organizational response
to disruptive change (Barr et al., 1992; Kaplan et al., 2003; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000).
Behavioural and routine-based conceptualizations of capabilities have been criticized for
ignoring the role of cognition as a precondition of capability development (Gavetti,
2005). External disruptions may require firms to recognize capability needs that may
originate in domains distant from their existing capability base, making it difficult for
incumbents to develop a coherent understanding of how to respond to the disruption
(Gilbert, 2006). Confined within the learning boundaries of their established practice
(Scarbrough et al., 2004), incumbents find it challenging to tap into and make sense of,
semi-distant knowledge related to the disruption.
To address this gap, we draw on social learning and cognition theories to investigate
specific learning processes that firms adopt to engender cognizance, i.e. a shared under-
standing of capability development needs and of the factors that influence the internal-
ization of these capabilities. By internalization, we mean the decision to organically (e.g.
internal investment) or inorganically (e.g. acquisition) develop a new capability. Follow-
ing Winter (2003), we define a capability as an incumbent’s ability to reliably achieve
organizational goals within a given institutional context. We adopt a qualitative method
of inquiry using in-depth interviews and case studies to probe into the processes by which
organizations generate cognizance of capability development needs.
Our empirical investigation focuses on corporate venture capital (CVC) activity, a
corporate activity particularly prevalent in technology-intensive industries. CVC invest-
ments refer to established industry incumbents’ participation in the private equity market
by providing start-ups with funding in return for equity positions (Gompers and Lerner,
2000). Although all CVC investments have financial motivations (Chesbrough, 2002),
learning and the gathering of market and technology intelligence are generally re-
cognized as being among the most important objectives of this investment activity
(Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005a; Wadhwa and Kotha, 2006), in particular in technology-
intensive industries. Through the process of evaluating and investing in start-up ventures,
the incumbent gains a window on emerging technologies and markets (Dushnitsky and
Lenox, 2005a; Siegel et al., 1988) and develops a mechanism to spot market trends that
may eventually guide its own capability development. Because innovative start-ups often
operate in domains of emergent industry practice, CVC investment provides a valuable
mechanism through which incumbents can develop cognizance of future capability
needs (Keil, 2002). Although these learning benefits are relatively well established in the
literature, the detailed mechanisms underlying this learning and cognizance formation
have not received empirical attention. Our study therefore adds much needed detail to
the often rather stylized descriptions in received research.
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In our study, we found that, through their CVC investments, incumbents engaged in
a process of learning through experimentation in which the incumbent did not directly
engage in operational functions. Instead, we found a process of knowledge brokering
(Hargadon, 2002; Hargadon and Sutton, 1997) in which the incumbent – through a
specialized unit acting as a knowledge broker – actively engaged in developing, experi-
menting with, and learning novel technical and related business practices; a form of
experimentation outside organizational boundaries, which we term as ‘disembodied
experimentation’. Disembodied experimentation exhibits similarities to well-researched
learning processes such as experimental learning, trial and error learning or mimicking,
yet it also differs from these in an important way. Instead of taking place within organi-
zational boundaries, the firm engages in disembodied experimentation when the learning
processes are situated outside its boundaries, allowing the firm to experiment with
emerging technologies and business practices that would be otherwise difficult to access or
perform within the firm. By participating in their portfolio firms, incumbents gained
access to communities of practitioners that were experimenting with novel technologies
and business models. Peripheral participation in the emerging community (Lave and
Wenger, 1991) enabled the incumbents to access socially embedded and highly situated
knowledge, understand it within the context of its creation, interpret it within the context
of incumbents’ established practice and hence develop insight concerning the implica-
tions of the disruption. By participating in several related ventures, the incumbents were
able to more quickly identify a ‘robust core’, or the ‘smallest common denominator’ of
practices that was likely to be relevant for its own capability development. Through
disembodied experimentation, the incumbents thus developed cognizance of their future
capability development needs. In subsequent sections, we explain how we derive these
findings and their implications for theories of learning and capability development.
METHOD
We conducted five in-depth longitudinal case studies of corporate venture capital pro-
grammes in large firms operating in the information and communication technology
sector over a four-year window from 1998 to 2002, thereby covering a full cycle of
growth and decline in corporate venture capital activity. In 2005, we followed up on
these investments and conducted further interviews and collected secondary data to
interpret capability-building actions and outcomes.
Our choice of a longitudinal case study methodology was motivated by two main
considerations. First, our concern in this study is with the mechanisms through which
CVC investments contribute to learning and cognizance formation. Although CVC
investments have been studied from a number of perspectives, including that of a
learning perspective (Keil, 2002), there has been little theorizing concerning the mecha-
nisms underlying such processes. This gap suggests an inductive case-based approach to
the study of the phenomenon. The learning and experimentation processes we study are
highly complex, and they may take up to several years to unfold. To capture the richness
and complexity of learning and cognitive processes is virtually impossible by means of a
cross-sectional study (Yin, 1994). The inductive case method is much better suited to
analysing complex longitudinal phenomena such as disembodied experimentation.
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We used an embedded case study design, embedding the analysis of multiple invest-
ments within each company-level case study. Even though capability formation is essen-
tially a firm-level phenomenon, it was important for our purposes to connect firm-level
decision-making with venture-level investment and monitoring activity. Although more
complex as a study design, embedded case studies improve the likelihood of richer and
more accurate emergent theory (Yin, 1994). We developed theory inductively through
multiple cases using a replication logic in which cases were treated as a series of
experiments, each serving to confirm or disconfirm inferences drawn from other cases
(Eisenhardt, 1989a; Yin, 1994). Multiple cases improved the generalizability and
grounding of the theory when compared with single case studies. We also adopted the
format proposed by Leonard-Barton (1990), in which a single, or in our study, two case
studies functioned as lead case studies, were investigated in greater depth and drove the
theory development, while additional cases functioned as replication case studies to
improve the generalizability of the findings from the lead cases.
We focused on CVC as a process for recognizing capability voids. According to prior
research, through CVC investments, the incumbent can learn about emerging technolo-
gies and changing competitive dynamics (Chesbrough, 2002; Dushnitsky and Lenox,
2005b; Maula and Murray, 2002). Through CVC investments, incumbents explore new
opportunities and engage in a renewal process that includes recognizing and understand-
ing emerging opportunities, thereby making CVC activities an ideal context to study how
incumbents become aware of capability needs.
Our case selection was motivated by theoretical considerations as opposed to statistical
sampling. We chose the information and communication technology (ICT) sector as our
empirical setting, which includes telecom equipment and services, computer hardware
and software services, as well as the industries supplying components to these sectors, such
as semiconductor manufacturing. We chose this sector because it frequently experiences
rapid, often disruptive change that makes capability development both important and
challenging. ICT technologies frequently enable the reorganization of value chain activi-
ties to create new, often disruptive business models, which can rapidly grow to threaten
and marginalize incumbents’ established business activities. The ICT sector is also one of
the most active industry sectors in terms of CVC investments (Dushnitsky, 2006).
Within the ICT sector, we chose to focus on a set of large firms that are particularly
active investors in CVC. We chose to focus on large corporations since these firms are
typically the most active CVC investors. Smaller firms typically lack the resources to
strategically engage in CVC activity (Dushnitsky, 2006). Furthermore, data on CVC
investments by large incumbents are more readily available from external sources,
allowing us to triangulate data and thereby improve the reliability of our analysis. Finally,
because large incumbents have established dominant positions in their sectors, they are
most concerned about reacting to emerging trends that might undermine their domi-
nance over time. These firms are therefore the most likely to engage in different forms of
experimentation to build cognizance about future capability needs. We started by iden-
tifying all firms in the sector that had carried out CVC investments during our study
period and collected secondary data on these firms. We conducted exploratory inter-
views with managers of these firms. We ultimately selected five large incumbents for our
in-depth case studies because they differed in their overall approach to investing and
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provided a rich variety of success and failure experiences, thus allowing us to draw
inferences concerning the relationship between learning mechanisms and capability
formation. The five incumbents provided an important cross-section of the global ICT
sector that were comparable with one another but also maximized variance in actions
and outcomes pertinent to our question of capability formation. An overview of these
companies is provided in Table I.
We collected data from multiple sources: (1) quantitative and qualitative data from
semi-structured interviews with key managers; (2) quantitative data on their CVC invest-
ments; and (3) archival data from company and public sources. We conducted 85
interviews with 62 managers to gain a deeper, contextual understanding and to provide
a longitudinal perspective. Our interviewing strategy focused on accessing multiple levels
within each organization as well as from different functional areas to better understand
how these investments were made, managed and linked to capability development within
the firm. We interviewed senior executives including CEOs (11 interviews), middle
managers responsible for CVC units and operational divisions interfacing with these
CVC units (30 interviews), and managers responsible for single investments within the
CVC unit (44 interviews). Interviewees also differed in the degree to which they had
commercial and technical responsibilities. This broad cross-section of participants
allowed us to gain a richer understanding of the companies as well as reducing the
potential for ex-post rationalization bias due to group pressure on a particular manage-
ment level or a functional area. We interviewed select managers multiple times over the
course of the four-year period.
An initial interview was conducted with a manager responsible for venturing activities.
During this interview, CVC was discussed at a general level and the study design and
case selection criteria were presented. After the initial interview, semi-structured inter-
views were conducted with interviewees identified by the gatekeeper. Towards the end of
each interview, the interviewee was asked to name additional contacts for the researcher.
With the help of this procedure, we accessed a larger group of interviewees without
stretching the time commitment of the interviewees.
Interviews ranged from a half hour to several hours but most interviews averaged an
hour in duration.Weused an interview guide that varied in themes and questions forCVC
Table I. Overview of the case companies
Name Core businesses Sales in
$ million
(1998)
Sales in
$ million
(2004)
Geographic
coverage
Number of CVC
investments
(1998–2002)
Number of
interviews
ALPHA Telecom equipment 15,500 35,700 Global 62 47
BETA Telecom services 2,000 10,600 Europe, USA 13 21
GAMMA Telecom services 42,000 69,800 Europe, USA 74 6
DELTA Telecom and IT
equipment (diversified
consumer electronics)
25,500 90,000 Global 98 7
EPSILON Telecom and IT
components
8,500 12,500 Global 39 4
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managers and corporate managers. First, we asked for background information on the
interviewee and their operational responsibilities. Next, we asked each respondent to
provide us with a history and rationale for their companies’ CVC activities. This broad
introduction was complemented by several open-ended questions. Questions were
adapted to the roles that each interviewee played in the corporation and its CVCactivities.
From senior executives, we solicited information on the broader strategic goals and the
decision-making processes pertaining to capability development. Frommiddle managers,
we inquired about the detailed processes used to operate the CVC unit and the relation-
ships between theCVCunit and other divisions.With operationalmanagers, we discussed
issues relating to particular investments in which they were involved. All interviews were
taped and transcribed. For five interviews where the interviewee declined permission to
tape the interview, we took copious notes that were transcribed immediately after the
interview. The transcriptions from all the 85 interviews totalled 870 pages.
We supplemented our interview data with quantitative data on the incumbents’ CVC
investments. For this purpose, we collected information on all CVC investments carried
out by these incumbents from the Thomson’s Venture Xpert database, which has detailed
information on investment rounds and some limited information on investment targets.
We complemented this information from websites of the start-up ventures. We collected
additional data from archival sources including minutes of meetings, process documen-
tation, annual reports and reports to financial analysts, press releases, company websites,
news releases and business publications. We used the data to solicit additional informa-
tion from our interviewees, as well as to challenge and triangulate conclusions derived
from our interviews.
For data analysis, we used established protocols that are proposed in the literature
(Miles and Huberman, 1994; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The underlying principle of
these protocols is to rotate among data, literature and emerging theory moving from
description to explanation (Eisenhardt, 1989a). As is typical in inductive research, we first
created individual case studies, condensing and synthesizing the interview transcripts and
archival data. In this process, we used the venture investment and archival data to
triangulate the interview data. These efforts substantially improved the reliability of our
narrative accounts. The authors of this study repeatedly examined and discussed the data
to generate a more complete and accurate account of the cases.
Parallel with the case description, interviews were coded (Strauss and Corbin, 1998).
Initially, we developed a list of initial codes based on our knowledge of the research
domain. During the coding process, these codes were supplemented by additional first
order codes that emerged from the data. In the following step, we condensed the
resulting list of codes and merged codes that were conceptually identical. These codes
were then used to identify emerging relationships in the cases. First order codes, second
order concepts, and aggregate themes are summarized in Table II.
We discussed transcripts and data among the authors to focus on patterns that
appeared across data sources. As these relationships emerged, we compared the data-
driven framework with a broad spectrum of academic literature. We found that our
empirical framework matched best with literature on organizational search and learning.
We compared empirical patterns with this literature, also known as pattern-matching
(Yin, 1994). This analysis proceeded through multiple rounds of iterating between data,
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constructs and theory. For all relationships, we triangulated findings across cases, across
interviewees within one case and across different types of data (interview, investment and
archival) to ensure the robustness of our conclusions. Taken together, this process
allowed us to build the model that is depicted in Figure 1 which draws upon existing
theory yet is based upon evidence from the case studies conducted, which helped assuage
validity and reliability concerns often voiced in qualitative work.
Table II. First order codes, second order concepts, aggregate themes
First order codes Second order concepts Aggregate theme
Entrepreneurial experience Broker functional
experience
Brokering roles
M&A experience
Venture capital experience
Technical experience
Personal connections within corporation Broker social capital
Personal networks into venture capital community
Formal relationships and interactions within corporation
Third party fund investments External endorsement
Dedicated venture capital partner
Overly tight integration with the business units Structural barriers Internalization
impediments
Isolation from corporate parent
Mismatched organizational structure
Reporting structure unclear
Short term business unit logic Cognitive barriers
Information contradicting established corporate practice
Contextual information used to present information
New business model to existing practices
Knowledge Brokering Roles
Disembodied 
Experimentation
Capability Internalization
Internalization Impediments
(+)
(+)
(–)
Figure 1. Disembodied experimentation and capability internalization
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CORPORATE VENTURE CAPITAL AND DISEMBODIED
EXPERIMENTATION
In recent years, CVC programmes have been started in a large number of companies
across many industries (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005a; Maula and Murray, 2002). These
investments show the growing recognition that start-ups are often the vanguard of
technological change. Incumbents frequently study these firms to discover promising
technologies and new market opportunities. CVC investment is a mechanism that can
connect incumbents to start-ups that are likely to introduce disruptive technologies.
Interactions with start-ups may offer incumbents opportunities to learn skills that could
be used in existing businesses or to learn about emergent technological shifts that could
be applied in developing new businesses and capabilities (Chesbrough, 2002; Dushnitsky
and Lenox, 2005b; Maula and Murray, 2002).
The CVC investment portfolio developed by the incumbent opens up multiple learn-
ing avenues. By holding board seats, or otherwise retaining observer rights in their CVC
portfolio companies, incumbents can closely monitor the operations of its portfolio
ventures and learn through actively participating in its decision making and operations
(Keil, 2002). By using this window to acquire broad-based knowledge on emerging
technologies and markets, incumbents can establish a foundation for planning their
future operations and investments in emerging technology areas. Participating in the
boards of CVC portfolio firms also allows the incumbent to participate in the social
networks that actively structure the emerging business domain, thus providing the
incumbent with an opportunity to tap into tacit knowledge embedded in emerging
domains. Incumbents’ business units may also engage in projects with the start-ups,
which could further facilitate knowledge acquisition, transfer and assimilation into the
incumbent’s organization (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005b).
To understand the challenges imposed upon incumbents by external disruptions, it is
useful to consider them as islands of emergent industry practice. The social learning
literature has emphasized the situated and socially embedded nature of emergent prac-
tice (Brown and Duguid, 1991, 2001; Lave and Wenger, 1991; Orlikowski, 2002;
Scarbrough et al., 2004). Within communities of practice, actions and related insights
(i.e. emergent practices) are closely intertwined and subject to ongoing sense-making
and social construction (Lave and Wenger, 1991; Orlikowski, 1992). Practice is defined
as ‘action informed by meaning drawn from a particular group context’ (Cook and
Brown, 1999) and seen as embedded in a given organizational and institutional setting
(Scarbrough et al., 2004). Practice is constantly created and regenerated as insider-
practitioners encounter and attempt to resolve problems (Lave and Wenger, 1991). This
process is subject to ongoing structuration, as insider-practitioners develop and share
insights and form shared views of ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’ practices (Cook and
Brown, 1999) and construct symbolic meanings for actions and related outcomes (Brown
and Duguid, 2001). In such communities, knowledge becomes highly situated and
confined to networks of insider-specialists.
The ongoing process of creating practice and emergent knowledge within a commu-
nity of practice makes the emergent knowledge leaky and easily accessible for members
of the community, yet gives rise to specific access, acquisition and assimilation challenges
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for outsiders. The way knowledge is generated and shared erects ‘learning boundaries’
along the boundary lines of the same community (Brown and Duguid, 2001; Scarbrough
et al., 2004). Carlile (2002) identified three barriers to learning that arise from such a
situation: syntactic or language barrier which refers to a situation in which flow of
information is constrained because of the absence of a common syntax between groups;
a semantic, or meaning barrier arises when groups interpret information differently, due
to different symbol systems; and a pragmatic, or practice barrier refers to knowledge flow
constraints due to differing practices among groups. Therefore, while insights may
accumulate within emerging communities of practice, it can be prohibitively difficult for
industry incumbents to access and make sense of these insights by relying on vicarious
observation. When disruptions are driven by emergent practice in close-knit communi-
ties of insider-specialists, traditional learning mechanisms may fail to permeate the
learning boundaries of the socially-contained network.
CVC as a Form of Disembodied Experimentation
To become cognizant of future capability needs, incumbents need to access, interpret
and integrate rich information on market and technological trends and related practice,
competitor actions and reorganizations of existing capability sets to address new oppor-
tunities. The need for rich information in emerging domains, in turn, requires access to
social networks that construct and carry this knowledge (Brown and Duguid, 1991, 2001;
Burt, 1992; Carlile, 2004; Granovetter, 1973). A CVC manager in ALPHA pointed
out: ‘Once you are involved in an area, you start getting access to information there
that others cannot get . . . So, one could also say that you are buying yourself access
to information networks.’ Establishing access to venture capital networks is not trivial to
achieve, as emerging social networks are often highly exclusive (Eisenhardt and
Schoonhoven, 1996; Stuart, 1998). As one CVC manager in DELTA pointed out:
The social network is important because venture capital is a closed community. Social
relationships between the senior partners in prominent venture capital firms are
extremely important . . . [Venture Capitalists] receive hundreds of proposals of very
diverse quality. Information overload makes it necessary to rely much on referrals
. . . some of the best work is done on the basis of referral only.
Much of the sense-making in emerging domains is mediated through discursive
devices, such as narratives, stories and significant examples (Phillips et al., 2004). Stories
and narratives enable participants of emerging domains to make sense of events and
form coherent responses to eventualities (Lave and Wenger, 1991; Thompson, 2005).
Much of the knowledge on emerging markets and technologies is in the process of being
constructed and hence, in the form of narratives, learning the knowledge embedded in
social networks requires active participation in the emerging sub-culture of the new field.
Active participation in social networks of the new field allows the learner not only to
learn by doing, but also to participate in shaping the emergent knowledge. As one
venturing manager in ALPHA pointed out, ‘you have to be involved directly. If you don’t
do the work yourself you just don’t get the learning.’ A manager in GAMMA further
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underlined the point that ‘this kind of [tacit] knowledge transfer is only possible by
working intensely together. By only sitting together once in a while you don’t get that.’
These quotes resonate with Lave and Wenger’s (1991) observation that learning, under-
standing and interpreting in emerging domains involve significant amounts of implicit
knowledge, which loses its significance outside its communal context. To access such
knowledge, in Lave and Wenger’s (1991) terminology, requires acquiring community
identity through ‘legitimate peripheral participation’ and through this identity, access to
the community’s knowledge. The importance of acquiring such identity by ‘working
intensely together’ was highlighted in both ALPHA’s and GAMMA’s experience.
To create cognizance, it also matters how closely the CVC portfolio ventures are
related to the incumbent’s core business. We found that corporations seldom invest in
ventures that are close to their existing technologies or business models. One executive
from DELTA explained: ‘If something gets really close we want control. In those cases
we do not invest as a VC but would rather acquire the venture.’ However, as relatedness
to the technological and business capabilities decreases, CVC investments become more
common. For instance, a venture manager in ALPHA explained their rationale:
When we determine the areas in which we invest, we consider that we are creating
new businesses for ALPHA. Regarding [technologies], we tend to think differently
than ALPHA in general does. We don’t necessarily believe on the same mantra, like
[technology example] and stuff . . . We don’t try to cover the [technology example]
developments, but rather, we try to cover developments that are based on, for
instance, [technology example] or Internet in general . . . We are trying to provide a
second opinion, for ALPHA generics.
We found that the likelihood of CVC investment decreased for ventures that were far
removed from the incumbent’s capability set. Though there could be areas of overlap in
the distant future between genetics and telecommunications networks, one manager in
ALPHA explained: ‘we are not that interested in biotech at the moment, partly because
ALPHA won’t be there, but also because we don’t have anything to add to the biotech
area.’ This focus on semi-distant domains, that are neither too close, nor too far, can be
understood by the importance of practice for the generation of insights concerning
emerging areas (Scarbrough et al., 2004). Knowledge too close to the learning organi-
zation’s own domain is likely to be subsumed by the organization’s current practices, and
consequently fail to provide valuable information on divergent capability needs. Knowl-
edge distant from the learning organization’s existing domain would be far removed
from the knowledge originator’s ‘embedding circumstances’ (Brown and Duguid, 2001)
to lend itself for re-embedding in the learning organization’s context. Semi-distant
learning locus will provide for sufficient divergence, yet still lend itself for the conduit and
re-embedding of learned insights (Sapienza et al., 2004).
Our data confirm that CVC investments provided the incumbents with access to
semi-distant knowledge that originated in domains of emergent practice. A manager in
ALPHA described the learning benefits of CVC investment with the following terms: ‘I
would say early warning would be the term to describe our role. This is a radar, which
sees with a 360-degree lens.’ Investments that provided the incumbents with early
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warning benefits were typically made in firms that pursued alternative technologies or
business models that had the potential to become a threat to the existing business model
of the incumbent. While some investments provide weak information about market
changes, other investments provided the companies with useful access to moderately
distant knowledge. A manager in EPSILON noted, ‘EPSILON invests if the link with
current strategy is more indirect . . . if the venture might be one step removed from our
roadmaps.’ Similarly, a venture in BETA provides another example. While BETA’s
distribution capabilities were limited to markets in which it owned network infrastruc-
ture, this venture was selling network independent services and penetrating markets
without owning network infrastructure. By investing into the venture, BETA learned
about the capabilities necessary to set up distribution for network independent services.
The knowledge that the incumbents gained access to and internalized, should not be
confused with fully-fledged capability transfer. Rather, through their CVC investments,
incumbents learned about capabilities that they would need to build in the future. This
was expressed by a manager in ALPHA: ‘If the [venture] turns out to be something
important, you have to put in your own machines.’
We conceptualize the above learning process as disembodied experimentation. Disembod-
ied experimentation differs from learning processes documented in the organizational
learning literature. In disembodied experimentation, the learning organization learns
through a representative agent who participates in emergent practice. Through partici-
pation in external contexts the firm representative is freed from the constraining influ-
ence of established cognitive frameworks and dominant logics within the parent
corporation. Rather than merely observing and learning vicariously, active participation
allows the representative to build both tacit and codified knowledge that resides in the
new start-up context. Thus, the key challenge for disembodied experimentation is to
assimilate and transform the acquired knowledge into the context of the incumbent
(Zahra and George, 2002). This process is constrained by the often non-articulated, tacit,
or behavioural nature of the knowledge and understandings acquired, as well as by the
need to penetrate the learning organization’s established belief systems and information
filters for meaningful interpretation.
In Table III, we contrast disembodied experimentation against other learning mecha-
nisms within organizations. In disembodied experimentation, the focal incumbent’s
representative maintains at least a semi-active presence in both contexts and conse-
quently, he/she is able to operate as a knowledge broker who transfers knowledge from
the external context to the context of the incumbent. This transfer can occur in several
ways. First, the focal incumbent’s agent interprets and codifies the knowledge from the
external context. Second, the agent transfers knowledge by learning tacit knowledge in
the external context and then applying this knowledge and teaching it to other members
of the incumbent. This transfer process is analogous to a student of the craft of building
music instruments travelling to Stradivarius to learn the violin building craft and then
passing on the learned knowledge on return to the home context.
The distinctive aspects of disembodied experimentation as a form of organizational
learning can be understood against the background provided by research on how
knowledge is created and transferred in communities of practice (Brown and Duguid,
1991, 2001). Participation in networks of insider-practitioners is critical for developing
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insight concerning emergent fields, because the duality between emergent practice and
related insight makes it difficult for external observers to understand them through
observation alone (Orlikowski, 2002). Further, much of this knowledge may not even
be disclosed to ‘outsiders’, i.e. individuals whose insider-specialist status has not been
acknowledged by the community. Finally, even if able to access emergent insights,
external observers would be inhibited in their comprehension by the established and
engrained practice of their own organizations. In short, to acquire knowledge concerning
emerging practice, one has to become a practitioner: ‘Learning . . . doesn’t just involve
the acquisition of facts about the world, it also involves acquiring the ability to act in the
world in socially recognized ways’ (Brown and Duguid, 2001, p. 200).
The highly situated and localized nature of emergent practice is well illustrated by
Orr’s ethnographic work (as cited in Brown and Duguid, 1991) on how service techni-
cians resolved problems unanticipated in their field work manuals. This process was
characterized by intense sense-making, as the service technicians ‘. . . respond[ed] to
whatever the situation itself . . . [threw] at them’ (Brown and Duguid, 1991, p. 47).
During the process, the service technicians developed not only solutions, but also sym-
bolic language to understand and make sense of novel problems and solutions. Accu-
mulated experiences were then transmitted from one technician to another in the form
of stories and narratives in a boundary-spanning web of colleagues bound together, not
by their organization, but by their shared professional status. Thus, ‘knowledge’ in
emerging fields is inevitably situated and often comprehensible only to those who possess
the same specialist experience. For this reason, Brown and Duguid (1991, p. 48; empha-
sis added) emphasized the importance of becoming an ‘insider’, as learners of emergent
practices: ‘. . . are acquiring not explicit, formal “expert knowledge”, but the embodied
ability to behave as community members’ in order to gain access to the practices and situations
in which the emergent knowledge takes on significance.
As a form of disembodied experimentation, corporate venture capital offers a way
to overcome some of the challenges described above. Disembodied experimentation
permits the focal organization to negotiate between emergent external practice and
established internal practice in such a way that reconciliation between these is potentially
achievable. Among the learning mechanisms described in the literature (Table III),
disembodied experimentation is unique in terms of its potential to connect communities
and transform emergent practice.
CAPABILITY BUILDING AND CORPORATE VENTURE CAPITAL
Disembodied Experimentation and Deliberate Capability Internalization
Disembodied experimentation acted as an input into the incumbent’s decision-making
regarding deliberate investment in capability development. In Table IV, we show sample
evidence of incumbents’ capability-building decisions subsequent to disembodied experi-
mentation through CVC. Through disembodied experimentation the incumbents
became aware of the need for specific capabilities anddeveloped a cognizance of how these
capabilities wouldworkwithin the organization. Before engaging in substantial capability-
building, ALPHA made a number of CVC investments into ventures that developed
services based on ALPHA’s equipment. Learning from these investments subsequently
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prompted ALPHA to restructure its operations, make focused investments into new
capabilities and create a business unit that specifically targeted the emerging market.
Instead of investing into internal trial-and-error learning, ALPHA’s CVCactivity enabled
it to learn through disembodied experimentation in an extra-organizational context.
Disembodied experimentation efforts influenced capability building decisions through
several mechanisms. In some instances, the incumbent decided to internalize a capability
developed in the CVC portfolio venture by either acquiring the start-up or by partnering
with it. Through acquisition and partnering, the disembodied experiment provided the
dual benefit of not only providing input into the incumbent’s decision-making process,
but also delivering the capability itself. This approach was used by EPSILON, who
acquired several of its portfolio ventures which had developed applications for EPSI-
LON’s core technologies.
While acquisitions and partnering arrangements were in evidence in our data, it was
more common for the disembodied experiment simply to provide input into the incum-
bent’s capability building decision without actually providing the capability itself. As an
example, ALPHA invested in several gaming-related ventures. While these ventures
helped ALPHA to better understand the market space, ALPHA’s management con-
cluded that the requisite capabilities would have to be built internally rather than
Table IV. Investment examples
Invested firm Year Investor Capability Outcome decision
TUNES 2000 ALPHA TUNES develops leading edge
streaming video and rich media
technology for the fixed internet
and wireless devices
ALPHA decided to develop devices
that specifically target the wireless
gaming market and launched a first
product in late 2003
PLAY 1999 ALPHA PLAY develops games for wireless
devices
ALPHA decided to develop devices
that specifically target the wireless
gaming market and launched a first
product in late 2003
AMUSE 2000 BETA AMUSE develops mobile
entertainment content
While AMUSE continues to serve
operator customers globally BETA
failed to integrate their mobile
capabilities
HELLO 2001 GAMMA HELLO provides of messaging and
mobility solutions for the corporate
and carrier markets
GAMMA has integrated the
technical platform that HELLO
developed for its fixed network
messaging services
SERVE 2000 DELTA SERVE develops standards-based
platform for enterprises and service
providers, to securely create and
deliver WLAN services
In 2005, DELTA decided to
integrate SERVE technology and
its capabilities through an
acquisition
RADIO 2001 EPSILON Radio develops software for digital
radio implementations
EPSILON co-developed a digital
radio solution integrating RADIO’s
software with DSP technology
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through acquisitions. Aside from helping identify requisite capabilities, disembodied
experimentation can also help avoid costly errors. ALPHA and DELTA had both made
investments in alternative wireless access technologies. These investments allowed them to
better understand the business logic in this space, as well as to become cognizant of related
capability needs. This awareness allowed them to avoid large-scale investment into
internal experimentation with alternative technologies.
Cognizance of capability gaps frequently does not arise from a single experiment, but
rather from a set of experiments. For example, ALPHA became aware of the emergence
of a new standard for representing Internet data that would enable a completely new
class of value-adding services. However, given its background as a telecommunications
company, ALPHA experienced difficulties evaluating these opportunities and in decid-
ing whether to enter this new space or not. To address this difficulty, ALPHA invested
in several ventures that operated in the new area. This limited experiment consisting of
multiple investments enabled ALPHA to start developing an informed understanding of
the emerging business logic in the new area. Rather than trying to transfer capabilities
from any of the ventures it had invested in, ALPHA decided to internally invest into
capability building consistent with its understanding of the new business logic. By
participating in a set of experiments, ALPHA was able to compare several ventures and
thus develop a robust understanding of the new knowledge domain. In emerging or
rapidly changing business areas, a single investment might not provide sufficient infor-
mation to provide for informed capability-building decisions.
In addition to the insights that participative observation in portfolio ventures provide,
additional input into capability-building decisions can be obtained by monitoring CVC
deal flow. While the information that can be passed on reviewed business plans is limited
due to non-disclosure obligations, all business plans a corporate venture capitalist reviews
inform his or her understanding of how the markets and technologies in question
operate; this knowledge is valuable in evaluating internal capability-building projects.
One corporate venture capital manager commented:
People who are involved in our fund are also involved in [our corporate] strategy
round. Sometimes we just speak up and say: ‘That will never work. I have seen it!
Guys, that’s complete [nonsense], I’ve seen the total opposite here in a start-up.’
Taken together, disembodied experiments provided several mechanisms to influence
capability building decisions. Therefore, we posit that:
Proposition 1: Disembodied experimentation by an incumbent will increase the likeli-
hood of deliberate capability-internalization efforts.
Cognizance, by definition, is a necessary precondition for subsequent deliberate
investment into capability-building. However, incumbents face powerful inertial
forces resulting from established cognitive filters, which inhibit the assimilation and
transformation of acquired external information (e.g. Leonard-Barton, 1992). Our cases
suggest that two factors moderated how effectively disembodied experimentation
through CVC investments influenced capability-building efforts. We found that the
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corporate venture capital manager’s knowledge-brokering function was a positive
moderator, while adaptation complexity was a negative moderator of the relationship
between disembodied experimentation and capability internalization efforts. We present
evidence for each of the constructs in Table V.
Knowledge Brokering, Disembodied Experimentation and Capability
Internalization
We observed that CVC units occupy structural holes (Burt, 1992) in boundary-spanning
networks that connect between the incumbent’s context and that of the emerging
organizational field. This position enabled them to function as a knowledge broker that
mediated knowledge between multiple contexts of emerging and established practice
(Hargadon, 2002; Hargadon and Sutton, 1997; Obstfeld, 2005). Because of their mul-
tiple investments, CVCmanagers were able to participate in several disembodied experi-
ments while maintaining a foothold in the corporate context.
Our data revealed three important characteristics that influenced the effectiveness of
CVCmanagers in mediating and translating knowledge and insights from one context to
another. First, CVC managers needed to be deeply embedded in the social networks of
both the start-up venture and the incumbent. Second, the functional backgrounds of
CVC managers influenced their effectiveness as knowledge brokers. Third, we found
that some CVC units leveraged external endorsement to improve their influence on
incumbents’ capability-building decisions. Table V summarizes evidence on these three
influences on knowledge-brokering effectiveness.
Once the venture capital managers had made investments in interesting ventures and
formed insights concerning potential capability voids within the incumbent, they fre-
quently connected these start-ups with senior managers to provide senior managers
with a window on new technologies and business models. Influencing decision-making
in this way is frequently an informal process in which it is important to expose the right
decision-makers to the right external contexts. Once the CVC manager had identified
interesting and potentially significant hubs of emergent practice, they often sought to
expose the learning organization’s decision-makers to those contexts. A manager in
ALPHA described this facilitation process:
[Our President] is currently sitting in our premises in [location]. He is meeting many
of these companies, which is giving him a [very realistic] view of these companies. It
is very difficult for a senior manager to get this first-hand information . . .
In addition to using their insider-specialist status to facilitate direct exposure of key
decision-makers to relevant external loci of emergent practice, CVCmanagers also spent
significant amounts of time regularly liaising withmultiple locations within the incumbent
in an effort to provide a continuous flow of insights and build a platform for influencing
capability-building decisions within the incumbent. A manager in DELTA pointed out:
We have a network of people over the corporation.We exchange information in formal
and informal discussions.We try not to over-coordinate.Of course, we have regular and
informalmeetings, ad hocmeetings. Butmost of this is daily conversation on the phone.
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Well-embedded CVC managers can provide fresh insights for the incumbent’s inter-
nal decision-making processes, challenge established beliefs and provide viable alterna-
tives outside the incumbent’s local search zones. However, the CVC managers in
our sample varied considerably in their knowledge brokering effectiveness. ALPHA,
GAMMA and DELTA succeeded in creating strong internal networks by recruiting
personnel for their CVC divisions internally from established business units. These
recruits brought with them substantial social capital and concomitant embeddedness in
corporate social networks. In addition to informal, social networks, ALPHA instituted
formal knowledge exchange networks. ALPHA’s CVC managers also participated in the
corporate strategy process, which empowered them to provide important insight into
strategic planning and draw on their insight concerning incipient trends to provide views
on the incumbent’s capability voids. As a contrasting example, in BETA, CVCmanagers’
attempts to build strong internal networks failed because they hadbeen recruited primarily
from outside the corporation. Lackingmeans to re-embed insights derived from emergent
external practice, they failed to influence BETA’s capability internalization decisions.
CVC managers’ functional experience combined with their social capital to influence
their effectiveness as knowledge brokers. Effective knowledge brokers complemented
CVC investment experience with technical business experience. Prior functional expe-
rience as an entrepreneur, in venture capital, or in corporate mergers and acquisitions
facilitated bridging the start-up and VC community, in one end and the business units,
on the other. An investment manager in ALPHA pointed out:
Funnily enough, most of the people in the group do have a mergers and acquisitions
background. Somehow it helps. If you have been buying companies outside, moving
into VC is rather an easy task, a small step. So that’s why some of the people here have
an M&A background.
To ensure sufficient connection with the established practice of the incumbent, the
case companies complemented their CVC managers’ investment experience with
technological knowledge from business units. One manager in DELTA described the
practice:
When we assess the companies, somebody from the business unit is always with us. We
have the technology check done by somebody who knows the technology. We do have
quite a lot of expertise in the group already, but because we are not part of the daily
business, we normally take into the team somebody who is responsible for that
technology in [parent company].
In addition to the social capital of the CVCmanagers and their functional experience,
some case companies relied on external endorsement. Rather than relying on the
expertise of their CVC managers, BETA and EPSILON relied on external experts to
evaluate ventures. Both companies initially partnered with a traditional VC to provide
deal flow and conduct due diligence. This approach replaced the problem of evaluating
unrelated knowledge with the problem of selecting an external agent to evaluate the
knowledge. Not coincidentally, both BETA and EPSILON did not have strong internal
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networks and had to bank on the credibility of their external networks to provide the
necessary clout to influence capability-building decisions. Through these external net-
works, these two CVCs were able to identify and understand capability voids. Whereas
BETA partnered with several traditional venture capital funds, EPSILON partnered
with a single venture capital firm. CVCmanagers in BETA and EPSILON believed they
did not, initially, possess an internal capability to assess firms operating far from their
core business, i.e. in distant search zones. To develop its evaluation skills, BETA sent
managers to work with the venture capital firm and get exposed to the venture capital
process. These employees were then leveraged to effect changes in the direct investing
procedures. One manager summarized:
We have our own representatives working in the VC fund. The idea was that they are
part of organizational learning. These people have a technological background and
would start working in a VC firm by providing assistance in the due diligence process
on the technological side. But at the same time they would learn the idea of business
development and venture capital investment.
Their relationships with existing venture capital funds allowed BETA and EPSILON
to learn how to evaluate ventures in varied domains. Not only did external endorsements
help increase firm investment in disembodied experimentation, they also served to
strengthen the incumbent’s belief that these capabilities needed to be internalized.
In summary, once valuable knowledge has been acquired, assimilated and trans-
formed within the CVC unit, it needs to be assimilated throughout the incumbent
corporation to have an impact. Challenged to influence the incumbent’s cognitive
framework, CVC managers needed to assuage the tension between emergent insights
concerning the incumbent’s capability voids and its prevailing cognitive frameworks. As
knowledge brokers, CVC managers have to carefully manage this process by controlling
the channels through which the new insights are introduced into the incumbent orga-
nization. We found that CVC units and their managers who had high social capital, prior
functional experience and strong external endorsement were better able to influence the
incumbent’s decisions to build capabilities identified through disembodied experimen-
tation. Therefore, we posit that:
Proposition 2: Contingent upon disembodied experimentation, knowledge-brokering
attributes including (a) broker social capital, (b) broker functional experience and (c)
external network endorsement will increase the likelihood of deliberate capability
internalization. Specifically, the relationship between disembodied experimentation
and capability internalization efforts will be stronger when knowledge-brokering
efforts are stronger than when they are weaker.
Adaptation Complexity and Deliberate Capability Internalization
Because of the importance of shared previous experience for the comprehension of
emergent practice, the transfer of contextualized knowledge across fields of practice is
inherently difficult. To perform effectively, therefore, the translating agent needs to be
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socially embedded in both the originating and in the receiving contexts. Failure to
employ double-embedded agents is likely to result in conflicts in the recipient organiza-
tion, as it will be prone to misinterpreting the signals it receives. Brown and Duguid
(2001) provide an illustrative example from Xerox where a novel imaging technology
developed by its research centre failed to gain acceptance in its mainstream business
divisions. Here, managers employed parameters normally used to evaluate established
imaging technologies to assess the potential of the novel imaging technology, even
though many of those parameters were irrelevant for the novel technology. In another
example, Brown and Duguid (2001) contend that Apple was able (unlike Xerox’s own
product divisions) to perceive the economic potential of Xerox-developed graphical user
interface (GUI) technologies, because its own experimentation in this emergent domain
had exposed it to alternative practice.
We refer to adaptation complexity to imply the complexities arising from the inter-
dependencies between technology and related business practices in emerging domains.
Where technology and its application is novel, their comprehension becomes difficult for
incumbents, whose cognition is encumbered by established practice. Two broad sets of
barriers exist in our data, both of which were driven by adaptation complexity: structural
barriers and cognitive barriers. Structural barriers reflect how the structural placement
of the CVC unit in relation to domains of originating and receiving practice created
barriers to identifying capability voids through disembodied experimentation. Cognitive
barriers refer to the difficulty associated with disentangling technological principles and
related practice due to discord between the learning organization’s established cognitive
frameworks and the new framework required to successfully deploy the new capability
(Gilbert, 2006).
The structural complexity barrier arises in a situation in which the CVC unit can be
positioned too close to either the new venture community or the incumbent. We found
several examples of how structural proximity encumbered capability development deci-
sions. DELTA required that any newCVC investment be approved by a relevant business
unit. While this helped link the investments to the needs of the business units and increase
their commitment to learn through disembodied experimentation, being subject to
business unit approval made it difficult for DELTA’s CVC unit to invest in ventures that
differed from DELTA’s established capability base. This structural proximity problem
reduced the likelihood of identifying significant new capability voids for the incumbent.
In contrast, BETA’s CVC unit was completely isolated from the incumbent. One
senior executive commented on the work done by the CVC unit: ‘I appreciate the work
done by [leader of the CVC] and his team, but their problem is that it is an isolated
activity. It is a desert island from other operations.’ If a CVC unit was structurally
isolated from the rest of the learning organization, knowledge assimilation was ham-
pered. Separation from the mainstream organization, ironically the very principle
that facilitates deviating cognition, thus may carry the seed that represses knowledge
assimilation. If structural proximity was either too high or too low, the CVC lost its
effectiveness in influencing capability internalization decisions through disembodied
experimentation.
Structural barriers can also arise from a mismatch between the structural embedded-
ness of the CVC unit and its strategic mandate. Different learning objectives of the CVC
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unit might require different linkages between the CVC unit and the incumbent. For
example, identifying capability voids of existing business units might require direct
linkages with these. On the other hand, identifying capability sets for new businesses
might require stronger linkages with the corporate headquarters and the top manage-
ment team.While we found that in four of the five cases, the reporting structure had been
designed in accordance with the strategic mandate, in BETA we found a mismatch.
In BETA, the CVC unit was linked to the incumbent’s corporate headquarters and
reported to a top management team member. However, its strategic mandate and
investment focus required it to closely cooperate with multiple divisions. This mismatch
created a structural barrier, which made it difficult for BETA’s CVC unit to influence
capability building decisions.
Apart from structural barriers, we discovered that cognitive barriers were frequently
quite subtle but powerful inhibitors of capability building decisions. In nearly all cases,
the cognitive barrier arose, not from a failure to understand the technology, but rather,
to understand the implications for practice. Organizational knowledge can act as a filter
that favours information that fits into existing mental models and schemata (Levinthal
and March, 1993; Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). New information that does not sufficiently
relate to existing heuristics may not be recognized as potentially valuable (Cohen and
Levinthal, 1990). New information might also contradict dominant cognitive frameworks
(Levinthal and March, 1993; Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) and might therefore be actively
suppressed (Leonard-Barton, 1995). Our case studies illustrate how, when challenged to
understand emergent practice, incumbents were constrained by their practice. ALPHA
provides an example of how capability needs for a new business were not understood
within the practice framework of the existing business. One of the opportunities inves-
tigated by ALPHA was the emergence of service opportunities based on their main
product. However, ALPHA experienced difficulties in evaluating these opportunities:
These services have been produced mainly by our customers using the hardware or
the infrastructure technology that we provided. If you look at [our] products, they are,
to a large extent, still tangible products. We see these new opportunities emerging but
we do not really understand the logic of these new services. How to use our technology
to tap those new opportunities? How to actually make it to a commercial business?
Because the dominant practice framework made it difficult for business line managers
to understand emerging business practice, distant experiments are easily seen as an
unnecessary diversion. Business units are usually managed for efficiency rather than
innovation (March, 1991) and this focus on exploitation may not allow them to look
beyond their existing business logic. We found that business units, which focused on their
established business logic, often viewed external CVC experiments as a waste of time and
money. As one manager explained: ‘It’s quite understandable that the divisions are
mostly focusing on their basic business concept . . . Whatever tries to make them divert
from the main course is viewed as a disturbance.’
When information about capability voids and the nature of the capabilities required
was in contradiction with existing knowledge of the incumbent, simple knowledge articu-
lation and codification no longer sufficed. One venturing manager in ALPHA stated:
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I work with every part of our organization to help expand our thinking, to introduce
potentially new paradigms. The question is how do you begin to plan the next five
years? I think a fundamental tension exists between core business focus and true
innovation . . . You don’t capture somebody’s mind by immediately putting their
existing business under attack . . . I have to show them how these technologies work
elsewhere to get them interested. . . .
Because of the cognitive filter imposed by established practice, one important mecha-
nism to reduce cognitive complexity and increase the likelihood of capability internal-
ization was to establish the validity of the new information by demonstrating its viability
in an external domain of emergent practice. Rather than trying to convince managers
by using arguments that might contradict established practice, the viability of the new
technology was demonstrated in a successful new venture business model. In short, the
CVC ventures used proto-businesses, rather than prototypes, to provide a viability
demonstration which embodied both novel technology and novel practice. Similar to the
use of prototypes in innovation processes to solicit market responses in new products
(Veryzer, 1998), these demonstrations allowed senior management to relate to the
non-local information and thus speed up its assimilation.
We found that exposing managers to rich contextual information and validation
evidence made it easier to bypass the cognitive barriers associated with internalizing a
new capability. ALPHA, BETA and EPSILON screened multiple alternative technolo-
gies and business models that were potentially threatening to their core technologies and
business models. Rather than reporting the findings in an abstract report, CVC man-
agers could draw on viable and high performing examples to present their case for
capability internalization. For the opportunity to become internalized, it was important
that the management saw how the incumbent’s current business model and capabilities
could be modified and stretched to take advantage of the opportunity. As an example,
one of BETA’s ventures aimed at providing network services with a new business model.
Rather than charging for capacity utilization, the venture charged according to trans-
actions completed. Originally, business units in BETA showed limited interest in this
business model, since the transaction-based business model seemed to provide little value
in a bandwidth-based business logic. The investment team in BETA worked with the
management team of one business unit to show them how developing the necessary
capabilities for a transaction-based business model would allow BETA to offer a whole
variety of new services. One venture manager commented:
At first, they rejected it, but this is understandable because their mission was to create
traffic. And the earning logic in [venture] is totally different . . . to minimize traffic in
order to get money from transactions. We had to work quite a bit to get them to see
that this would make sense for their business as well.
In summary, adaptation complexity in the form of structural and complexity barriers
were significantly negative influences on the likelihood of internalizing a capability
learned through disembodied experimentation. However, successful CVC managers
who drew upon successful cases to validate the potential of a new capability were able to
CVC and Capability Development 1497
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2008
disconfirm existing cognitive barriers that dissuaded adoption and hence improve the
probability of internalization.
Adaptation complexity becomes poignant when we consider our findings in the light
of existing literature that uses a routines-based lens and conceptualizes capabilities as
repetitive tasks performed by interdependent actors towards an organizational goal
(Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Winter, 2003). To achieve a higher level of performance,
interdependent organizational actors (in our case, CVC units and business units) needed
to understand both the context, in which routines are deployed, and the pertinent
action–outcome relationships in that context (Feldman and Rafaeli, 2002; Gavetti,
2005). We found that greater structural complexity impeded the adoption of routines and
decreased the likelihood of capability internalization, because the venture context was so
different from the incumbent’s context that the routines could not be executed in a
similar manner within the incumbent. We also found that greater cognitive complexity
discouraged internalization because the action–outcome relationships could not be inter-
preted in a similar manner: what worked in the start-up was seen to work because the
start-up was perceived to be ‘somehow’ different from the incumbent. Therefore, we
posit that:
Proposition 3: Adaptation complexity will negatively moderate the relationship
between disembodied experimentation and capability internalization efforts. Specifi-
cally, the relationship between disembodied experimentation and capability internal-
ization will be weaker when structural and cognitive complexities are higher than
when they are lower.
DISCUSSION
Building capabilities is a temporal and path-dependent process where the success of firms
and their future performance depends to a large extent on their ability to make the right
investments in capability-building. However, two important challenges make this a
difficult process to manage. First, the inertial constraints of existing operations provide an
ever increasing momentum for investment close to existing capabilities. Second, search
processes for solutions tend also be confined to existing search zones (Rosenkopf and
Nerkar, 2001). Building future capabilities is a process that is characterized by incom-
plete information regarding the optimal path for adopting new capabilities, as well as
unpredictability in its outcomes. In this study, we examined how large incumbents use
corporate venture capital investments to identify voids in their existing capability base
and how learning from CVC investments influences investment decisions in building
future capabilities.
Cognizance and Deliberate Capability Investments
We identified disembodied experimentation through CVC investments as an important
learning mechanism that incumbents use when moderately distant relatedness exists
between the capability requirements of an emerging area and the incumbent’s existing
capability base. We uncovered two important mechanisms through which disembodied
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experimentation facilitates deliberate investments in capability development: (1) creation
of awareness or cognizance to invest in building a capability was a critical driver: the
incumbent needs to sense the voids in its existing capability set and use multiple strategies
to create such awareness; and (2) overcoming inertial restraints to create new capabilities
in an environment where such capabilities would not normally form in due course.
We found two factors that influenced the relationship between disembodied ex-
perimentation and capability building decisions. First, a knowledge-brokering role or
strategy was a critical positive moderator of the likelihood of internalization. Influential
CVC managers used a strategy of (1) recruiting members with high internal social
capital, (2) recruiting members with strong functional experience, and (3) seeking out
network endorsement by accessing non-traditional networks unrelated to the incum-
bent’s core operations. CVC units that consistently employed these knowledge-
brokering strategies were more successful in influencing capability-building decisions.
Second, we found that simultaneous changes in technology and business models
created adaptation complexity which reduced the likelihood of disembodied experi-
mentation influencing capability building decisions. However, we also identified
mechanisms such as business prototyping that allowed the firms we studied to over-
come adaptation complexity.
These findings add to the organizational learning and capability development litera-
tures. First, while learning theories are often used to describe the capability development
process (e.g. Keil, 2004), few, if any, explain the processes through which incumbents
build cognizance of their capability building needs. Most studies tend to focus on existing
routines that organizations deploy to enhance performance or adaptation (George,
2005). For example, studies have examined how Amazon or Borders bookstores built
their capabilities (Raff, 2000) or how Yahoo and Excite evolved over time (Rindova and
Kotha, 2001). Received studies are largely silent about how incumbents create cognizance
and realize what voids exist in their current or future portfolio of capabilities. By focusing
on a CVC as a distinctive learning mechanism, this study adds to the literatures on
organizational search, organizational learning and capability development.
Scholars in the dynamic capabilities literature have argued that to adapt, organiza-
tions need the ability to acquire new capabilities, integrate capabilities in a new way,
or reconfigure existing capabilities (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Teece et al., 1997).
Recent research has investigated processes through which firms accomplish this adap-
tation of their resource base (e.g. Helfat and Peteraf, 2003). While there is substantial
progress in addressing the question of how to adapt capabilities, the literature does not
address the question of what capabilities the firm should build, integrate, or reconfigure
in the face of environmental change and how the firm can become cognizant of such
needs. This study’s findings on cognizance and deliberate capability development high-
light the importance of awareness and search processes as integral aspects of capability-
development decisions.
Disembodied Experimentation and Organizational Learning
Much of the literature on organizational learning describes learning as a process that
results in change in organizational practices, beliefs and cognition (Miner et al., 2001).
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This learning perspective has also described different learning mechanisms and their
outcomes (Argote, 1999; Miner et al., 2001; Van de Ven and Polley, 1992). Researchers
have described a wide range of mechanisms such as learning-by-doing (or experiential
learning) (Huber, 1991); improvisation (Miner et al., 2001); trial-and-error learning;
variation-reduction learning (Argote, 1999), mimicking and emulation. These learning
mechanisms vary in terms of their scope, purpose, content, required inputs and domi-
nant mechanisms, as illustrated in Table III.
Disembodied experimentation is a form of experimental learning where the incum-
bent varies inputs in an effort to detect and understand action-outcome relationships. As
systematic and controlled variation is introduced in learning inputs, the identification of
cause–effect relationships becomes possible (Argote, 1999; Huber, 1991). In emerging
business environments, cause–effect relationships are almost never deterministic, but
rather, constructed in the ongoing interaction between agents, technological structures
and the emergent economic structure of the new environment (Orlikowski, 1992). The
duality between actions and emerging structures makes it difficult for an external
observer to detect and understand relationships between actions and outcomes.
To develop robust understandings of ‘what works’ in the domain of emergent practice,
the observer needs to actively participate in several ongoing experiments in the new
context. In disembodied experimentation, an analogous process of participative varia-
tion was apparent. CVC investments introduced controlled variation both through
contexts and in the form of actions and business models. Variation in experiments
enables the observer-participant to identify the ‘smallest common denominators’ of
action–outcome relationships in a variety of idiosyncratic contexts. Comparisons
between contexts fostered cognizance and made it possible for the participant-observer
to begin the process of translation into the incumbent’s context and enabled the observer
to quickly spot capability needs. This combination of participation and observation in a
variety of external contexts provided for a unique form of learning that is distinctive from
those previously recognized in the literature.
Disembodied experimentation differs from other learning processes in that the locus of
learning resides outside of the firm’s cognitive and behavioural context. Even when we
consider mimetic behaviour, the locus of learning remains within the learning organi-
zation’s context because the observer-agent resides within organizational boundaries.
In the case of disembodied experimentation, the incumbent uses a boundary-spanning
strategy where the firm dispatches its representative to participate in learning processes
that unfold outside the firm’s boundaries. Importantly, such participation is not just
vicarious learning through observing others’ actions but an active involvement of the
agent in shaping that external context with the deliberate intent that useful knowledge
generated will be internalized into the incumbent.
Because external ventures operate in new or emerging product-market spaces, these
learning processes tend to be characterized by intense social construction and sense-
making, as the firm and the emerging organizational field develop a shared under-
standing of accepted ‘rules of the game’ (Garud et al., 2002; Rindova and Kotha,
2001). Emergent networks of specialist-insiders develop distinctive epistemic cultures
(Knorr-Cetina, 1999), which cannot be fully understood by an external observer whose
cognition is constrained by established practice within the learning organization’s
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context. Emergent sub-cultures define acceptable behaviours and behavioural rules,
which eventually come to define and select successful business models (Möller and
Svahn, 2006). Therefore, direct participation in the emerging context is necessary to free
the observer from cognitive biases caused by the learning organization’s established
belief systems that inevitably constrain observations made by agents if they reside within
the incumbent organization (March, 1991).
Disembodied Experimentation, CVC, and Other Mechanisms of
Capability Building
As we have documented, disembodied experimentation through CVC investments is a
learning mechanism that allows firms to build cognizance about the future capability
needs of the corporation by engaging in a social learning process. As such, disembodied
experimentation through CVC complements rather than replaces other mechanisms that
firms can utilize in their capability development activities. For instance, large firms in the
industries we studied engage in substantive scale research and development activities
(Patel and Pavitt, 1997). However, conventional research and development are often
limited to technological exploration, and they do not allow firms to explore capability
voids outside their established trajectories.On the other hand, development activities tend
to be geared towards extending existing knowledge trajectories and are therefore less
suitable to spot capability voids. Nonetheless, these limitations do not mean that corpo-
rations could not use mechanisms other than CVC to recognize capability voids.
Disembodied experimentation through CVC is also complementary to other inter-
organizational relationship types such as alliances and acquisitions. Acquisitions can be a
particularly suitable way to fill existing gaps in incumbents’ knowledge bases by internal-
izing proven new knowledge (Ahuja andKatila, 2001).However,most acquisitions are not
useful in spotting technologies or business models in their formative stages. Acquisitions
require large resource commitments by incumbents, making them rather unsuitable to
explore multiple, highly uncertain new technologies – a necessity when exploring future
capability needs. Also alliances might be highly suitable to technology transfer (Simonin,
2004). Yet, non-equity alliances may not give incumbents sufficient access to partners to
engage in the participatory processes that characterize disembodied experimentation.
R&D alliances also focus more on developing technologies without always considering
their business applications. Taken together, disembodied experimentation through CVC
investmentsmight best be viewed as onemechanismwithin a portfolio ofmechanisms that
firms utilize in the process in which they first form cognizance about their capability voids
and subsequently address these through focused capability development. The role ofCVC
investments might be primarily in identifying capability voids whereas other mechanisms
such as research and development, alliances or acquisitionsmight be utilized in supporting
capability development once capability voids have been identified.
Limitations and Conclusion
Some limitations of this study need to be taken into account and should be addressed in
future research. First, our empirical research has focused on CVC investments as a
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mechanism for disembodied experimentation. CVC investments are particularly preva-
lent in technology-intensive industries. Future research would need to identify other
mechanisms of disembodied experimentation used in less technology-intensive indus-
tries. More generally, this study remains exploratory in nature because of the limited
empirical scope of its observations. For instance, given that we have focused on large
firms in one industrial sector, we encourage large-scale empirical work that tests the
applicability of our findings across a wider set of industries and firms. This study focused
on learning from semi-distant sources specifically within corporate venture capital invest-
ments. Clearly, semi-distant learning is more likely to occur in this type of organizational
activity. However, future studies should investigate how other organizational activities,
such as R&D or product development could benefit similar semi-distant search processes
and how these processes interact in the capability formation processes of the firm.
Finally, although CVC investments are a cyclical activity similar to traditional venture
capital investments, we believe that cyclically varying levels of activity do not necessarily
compromise the validity of the theoretical mechanisms that we have discussed in this
study.
Limitations aside, our study makes important contributions to the search, learning and
capability development literatures. Specifically, it speaks to two important questions:
How do organizations sense voids in their capability base? What factors influence
deliberate investments in capabilities identified as valuable through disembodied experi-
mentation? Our study examines both of these questions in the context of external
corporate venturing, an important source for organizations to devise new products or
enter new markets. This study contributes to the learning literature by identifying
disembodied experimentation as a credible and distinctive type of learning mechanism
that incumbents use in distant search processes.
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